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Abstract Since Aristotle and the Stoa, there has been a clash, worsened by
modern predicate logic, between logically defined operator meanings and natu-
ral intuitions. Pragmatics has tried to neutralize the clash by an appeal to the
Gricean conversational maxims. The present study argues that the pragmatic at-
tempt has been unsuccessful. The “softness” of the Gricean explanation fails
to do justice to the robustness of the intuitions concerned, leaving the relation
between the principles evoked and the observed facts opaque. Moreover, there
are cases where the Gricean maxims fail to apply. A more adequate solution
consists in the devising of a sound natural logic, part of the innate cognitive
equipment of mankind. This account has proved successful in conjunction with
a postulated cognitive mechanism in virtue of which the universe of discourse
(Un) is stepwise and recursively restricted, so that the negation selects different
complements according to the degree of restrictedness of Un. This mechanism
explains not only the discrepancies between natural logical intuitions and known
logical systems; it also accounts for certain systematic lexicalization gaps in the
languages of the world. Finally, it is shown how stepwise restriction of Un pro-
duces the ontogenesis of natural predicate logic, while at the same time resolving
the intuitive clashes with established logical systems that the Gricean maxims
sought to explain.
1 Introduction
The clash between natural logical intuitions and formal logic has beset the discipline
of logic ever since its Aristotelian beginnings. Even nowadays the relation between
language, logic, and cognition is still utterly unclear. Modern logicians have striven
to make logic noncognitive and mathematical, thereby blocking further insight into
the cognitive basis of logic. The rich tradition in predicate logic, developed from
Aristotle on all the way through the Middle Ages till the twentieth century—a tradi-
tion in which logic, language, and cognition were intimately intertwined—was sum-
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marily dismissed, mainly by Bertrand Russell, on the facile grounds that this logic
was faulty. That, in the process, the baby was thrown out with the bathwater was
not recognized. The only connection modern logicians are prepared to accept is in
the area of syllogistic reasoning. But that is precisely what the present study is not
about, since reasoning, though no doubt a cognitive faculty, tells us little about the
structural and semantic properties of natural language.
Then, as far as linguistics is concerned, the “cognitivist” linguists and the prag-
maticists attempt to bridge the gap between natural logical intuitions and formal logic
by the introduction of the Gricean conversational maxims, regarded as the codifica-
tion of principles of rational linguistic interaction. Generally, cognitivist linguists
and pragmaticists decline to consider any possible relevance of logic for the study
of language, which is a pity because the system of natural logic together with one
or two cognitive principles provides a much stronger basis for an explanation of the
discrepancies between logical systems and natural logical intuitions than the Gricean
maxims will ever be able to afford.1 Chomskyan linguists are more open to logic in
that they accept a notion of “logical form” (LF), but the relation of LF with actual
logic has remained totally obscure. In cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics,
there is a strong tendency to avoid logic as an explanatory factor. The focus nowa-
days is mostly on experiments meant to elucidate processing mechanisms, in partic-
ular the relation between cognitive and neurological structures and processes, to the
detriment, unfortunately, of more theoretical concerns.
Montague’s combination of grammar and semantics comes closest. It uses logic,
more precisely logical model theory, as a tool in its quest for a semantics of natural
language, in that sentence meanings are seen as functions selecting sets of possi-
ble worlds. But this application of logic has failed to convince (see Seuren [20,
Chapter 9]), mainly because (a) it has no bearing on the cognitive reality of nat-
ural language, (b) it has no answer to the “propositional attitudes” problem, (c) it
fails to account for scope differences, and (d) it aims at formalizing bottom-up pars-
ing, whereas linguistic competence is defined by top-down production (see Seuren
[17], [19]).
Meanwhile, the clash between natural logical intuitions and established logical
systems has remained unsolved. It is argued here that the solution lies in the natural,
species-specific implicit logic that develops spontaneously, according to an innate
program, in each human individual. The present study is an attempt at reconstruct-
ing this logic by hypothesis. This is an empirical enterprise kept in check by the
empirical observation of natural logical intuitions and of more directly linguistic
facts—a common method in the human sciences.
This research program implies that the study of logic should be reunited with that
of language and cognition. To this end, it is necessary to re-examine the foundations
of logic. It then becomes clear that the neglect of traditional logic on the part of
contemporary standard predicate logic has led to a substantial impoverishment of
professionally sustained views of logic. The old square of opposition and Hamilton’s
much-despised triad of contraries turn out to be subparts of a generalized system
of natural logic, the hexagon of logical relations (see Blanché [1], [2]), which is
much richer and more functional than standard modern logic. The fault of undue
existential import (UEI) is easily removed, in terms of strict bivalence, by declaring
A-type sentences false when the restrictor class is null, though an empirically more
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adequate answer to UEI is the introduction of a third truth value of radical falsity for
cases where UEI plays up.
To explain certain systematic facts of nonlexicalization across languages and to
account for natural logical intuitions, the polarity division hypothesis is proposed,
which, by a process of stepwise restriction of the universe of discourse and thus of
the complement selected by negation, provides an adequate explanation for the facts
at issue in terms of the natural logic developed. This makes the Gricean maxims
otiose.
2 What is (a) Logic?
In defining what logic, or a logic, is, we must inevitably bring up many elementary
notions that are familiar to any beginning logician and should, therefore, not figure
in an article in a professional logical journal. Yet many other, equally basic, notions
must be brought up that may be familiar to professional logicians but are not or hardly
explained in elementary logic textbooks and are thus not or hardly known to wider
circles of logic aficionados, such as the metalogical relations of entailment, contra-
riety, subcontrariety, equivalence, contradiction, and logical independence. Since
these latter notions are essential to the analyses and arguments proposed below, there
is no other way than to go through the lot, whether well known or not. Moreover,
the perspective from which the basics of logic are looked at in the present study is
so different from what is found in logical circles today that an explicit treatment is
called for. Professionals will, therefore, have to bear with me.
A logic, any logic, is a system that formally defines relations of entailment or
contrariety among sentences. A sentence P entails a sentence Q, or Q logically
follows from P.P ` Q/, just in case whenever P is true, Q must also be true in
virtue of the meanings of P and Q. Thus, Alex has been murdered entails Alex is
dead, because it is in the meanings of (the main predicates of) these sentences that
whoever has been murdered is dead. To say that someone has been murdered but is
not dead is inconsistent. Clearly, when P ` Q, P and not-Q (we write :Q) are
inconsistent or, we say, they are contraries (we write PQ), in that they cannot be
both true at the same time (though they may be false at the same time), in virtue of
their meanings. The negation not (:) is a binary truth-value switch, changing the
value from “true” to “false,” and vice versa. P and Q are contradictories (Pj Q),
in any given universe of discourse Un, just in case P and Q cannot both be true
nor both be false at the same time: the truth of the one implies the falsity of the
other, either way. Given this definition of :, for any sentence P , P and :P are by
definition contradictories in any well-defined universe of discourse Un in which P
has a truth value.
I am using the term sentence where many textbooks use the term proposition.
Even though this use of the term sentence is not coextensive with the way the term is
used in linguistics, I prefer sentence to proposition because a sentence is a type-level
unit, whereas a proposition, taken in the sense of a hic et nunc mental act of assign-
ing a property to a (set of) individual(s) or to an n-tuple of (sets of) individuals, is a
token-level event. (In other publications I use the term L-proposition, instead of what
I call sentence here. This term denotes the type-level cognitive input to the grammar
of any specific language, but it is too theory-dependent to be used here.) Logic is
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to do with type-level relations between sentences or, rather, sentence types, not with
token-level events. If two token utterances, expressing two token propositions, are,
say, contraries, they are so in virtue of the fact that they instantiate type-level sen-
tences whose contrariety is determined by their type-level meanings. Moreover, the
use of the term sentence instead of proposition makes it more natural to extrapo-
late from logic as such to the language as a whole—a signal feature of the approach
proposed here. I will, however, follow conventional terminology when referring to
propositional functions, propositional logic, or propositional operators.
A logical system † depends on a restricted set of words (or morphemes), its con-
stants or operators, whose meanings allow for analytically necessary inferences—
that is, inferences valid for all possible situations. In the logics we operate with,
there are only a handful of constants, mainly the words some, all, not, and, and or.
There are a few more, but we will limit ourselves to these. In certain well-defined
positions in sentential structures, these operators allow for analytically necessary in-
ferences regardless of what lexical material fills the rest of the sentences involved.
Thus, the operators all and some can be defined in such a way that if all flags are
green is true, it follows by entailment that some flags are green is also true, and like-
wise for all sentences of the same types with different lexical predicates: all Romans
are mortal entails some Romans are mortal, and so forth. We generalize by replac-
ing the predicates flag or Roman by the lexical variable R (“restrictor term”) and the
predicates green and mortal by the lexical variableM (“matrix term”). And we say
that the sentence type all R is M entails the sentence type some R is M , given the
definitions of all and some that underlie this entailment.
In general, a logical system† is defined by its values on the following parameters:
(a) the axioms of †;
(b) the meanings of the operators (constants) of †;
(c) the values of the lexical variables of †.
Among the axioms, we normally count the principle of contradiction (no sentence
token can be both true and not true at the same time) and strict bivalence (there
are precisely two truth values, true and false).2 As regards (c), the values of the
lexical variables, when we work with a sentence type like All R is M , it should be
specified that the variables R andM range over predicates (propositional functions),
not over whole sentences, and when we work with a formula type likeA^B , it should
be specified that the variables A and B stand for either sentences or propositional
functions (though when they stand for propositional functions, the function form
M.x/ is preferred, where M is a lexical predicate). But what counts most in the
present context is parameter (b), which demands a specification of the meanings of
the nonvariable constants or operators, so that the metalogical relations of † follow
from these meanings.
The notion of logic is thus dependent on the notion of meaning: logic is to do
with analytical truth, in the Kantian sense. Another way of saying the same is to say
that logic defines not ordinary (synthetic) truth but validity or analytically necessary
truth, or truth in all possible situations. One can, of course, cavil about the fact that
there is neither unanimity nor clarity as regards the notion of linguistic meaning, but
I will not do that here. Though, as a linguist, I hold that meaning is more than truth
conditions, it suffices here to assume that conditions of (synthetic) truth are a central
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Figure 1 The construction of the logical hexagon from entailment or contrariety.
element in the definition of meaning. Other elements of meaning are not relevant in
the present context.
The following metalogical relations have so far been defined: entailment, contra-
riety, and contradictoriness. Further metalogical relations are logical equivalence,
subcontrariety, and logical independence. Two sentences P and Q are logically
equivalent (P  Q) just in the case when P ` Q andQ ` P . Logical equivalence
is thus two-way entailment. In the following, when we speak of entailment we mean
one-way entailment; for two-way entailment we use the term logical equivalence.
Two sentences P andQ are subcontraries (P Q) just in the case when P andQ
cannot both be false at the same time, though they may be true at the same time. Two
sentences P and Q are logically independent (no symbol needed) just in the case
when they can at the same time be both true, both false, or the one can be true while
the other is false.3
Given this metalogical toolkit, we can set up, for any given sentencesA andB , the
elementary logical triangle hA;B;:Bi of Figure 1.a.4 This triangle can be extended
to a square in virtue of the fact that when P ` Q, :Q ` :P (the theorem of
contraposition). This is easily shown: if it is the case that whenever P is true Q
must also be true, the truth of :Q necessitates the truth of :P , at least in a bivalent
logic with only the values true and false and nothing in between nor anything outside
these two values. We can thus extend the elementary logical triangle to the square
structure hA;B;:B;:Ai of Figure 1.b. In this square, the new metalogical relation
of subcontrariety between B and :A has arisen, as an extra bonus so to speak. That
in Figure 1.b, B and :A are subcontraries is easily shown: when B is false, :B is
true, and hence :A is true; when :A is false, A is true, and hence B is true.
We can go further, following Blanché [1], [2], and construct a logical hexagon, as
in Figure 1.c, with the help of the operators and (^) and or (_), just like :, taken
from propositional logic. In the logical hexagon, Y is defined as “both B and :A”
(B ^ :A), and U as “either A or :B” (A _ :B). One notices that the logical
hexagon combines the triad of contraries hA; Y;:Bi with the triad of subcontraries
hB;:A;U i, while the square structure hA;B;:B;:Ai is also preserved. We will
see below that this fact is indispensable for an understanding of the relation between
language, logic, and cognition.
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It follows from the foregoing that any relation of either entailment or contrari-
ety automatically, in virtue of the definitions of the metalogical relations and of the
meanings given for :, ^, and _, gives rise to a logical hexagon.
3 Some Systems of Predicate Logic
3.1 The square, the defect of UEI, and standard modern predicate logic The inven-
tor, or discoverer, of logic in the Western world was Aristotle (384–322 BCE). He
discovered the metalogical relation of contrariety and built up a system of predicate
logic for the quantifying words all and some, with the help of the other metalogical
relations of entailment and contradiction, and the propositional operator not (:).5
Aristotle did not explicitly take into consideration the relation of subcontrariety; that
notion was introduced a few centuries after his death. (As far as we know, by his com-
mentator Apuleius, who lived in the second century CE; see Seuren [18, p. 152].) He
distinguished the following eight sentence types, presented here in a new notation
which distinguishes the external or sentence negation (:) from the internal or pred-
icate negation (*):6
All R isM A All R is notM A*
Some R isM I Some R is notM I*
Not all R isM :A Not all R is notM :A*
No (D not some) R isM :I No R is notM :I*
In Aristotle’s logic, A:I, and hence A ` I, which, according to the pattern of
Figure 1.b, gives rise to the square structure of Figure 2.a.
This logic, as far as it goes, is exceptionless. However, Aristotle’s logical com-
mentators, in particular the Latin author Apuleius (c. 125–180), the Greek Ammo-
nius (c. 440–520), and the Roman Boethius (c. 480–524) thought that they could
improve or streamline Aristotle’s logic by positing what are now known as the con-
versions, that is, the equivalence of :A and I* and of :I and A*. Generally, the
conversions say that the internal negation can be substituted, salva veritate, for the
external negation, provided that the universal and the existential quantifier change
places (double external or internal negation cancels out). Another way of stating the
conversions is to say that A and I are duals (see Löbner [12]).
Intuitively, this makes sense, since, for example, not all flags are green is felt to
be equivalent with some flags are not green, and similarly for the other conversion
Figure 2 The classic square (a) in its pure form, (b) with the conversions.
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forms. What Aristotle’s commentators failed to see was that by introducing the con-
versions into the system, which Aristotle had not done, they restricted the validity
of the system to the situations where the R-class is nonnull, or ŒŒR ¤ ;.7 I there-
fore distinguish between Aristotle’s own logic, later completed and reformulated by
the French medieval philosopher Pierre Abélard or Petrus Abaelardus (1079–1142),
known in the English-speaking world as Peter Abelard, which I call Aristotelian–
Abelardian predicate logic (AAPL) on the one hand, and Aristotelian–Boethian pred-
icate logic (ABPL) on the other. Both are square structures, the former without the
conversions (see Figure 2.a) and the latter with the conversions (see Figure 2.b).
The latter is famously known as the traditional square of opposition (henceforth
the square), which dominated predicate logic for about 1500 years, until the early
1900s.8
When ŒŒR D ;, the square, with the conversions, becomes inconsistent. Abelard
observed that if :A is taken to be equivalent with I*, then I and I* are not subcon-
traries, because both I and I* are false when ŒŒR D ;: some Romans are mortal and
some Romans are not mortal are both false when there are no Romans, and so are
all Romans are mortal and some Romans are not mortal (see [18, p. 176]). An alter-
native way of showing the same is this: if, in cases where ŒŒR D ;, all Romans are
mortal is considered true, then, in the square, some Romans are mortal must also be
true, since A ` I (the “subaltern” entailment schema). But some Romans are mortal
requires, in virtue of the meaning of some, that there be Romans, quod non. If all
Romans are mortal cannot be true when ŒŒR D ;, then it must be false (in virtue
of the axiom of strict bivalence). But if all Romans are mortal is considered false
while ŒŒR D ;, some Romans are not mortal, now considered equivalent with not
all Romans are mortal on account of the conversions, must be true. But this again
requires that there be Romans, again quod non. Therefore, all Romans are mortal
can neither be true nor be false when ŒŒR D ;, which makes ABPL faulty. The
term commonly used for this logical defect is undue existential import (UEI). While
AAPL is logically faultless, ABPL is faulty because it suffers from UEI.
To make the square sound (under the axiom of strict bivalence), it is necessary
either to eliminate the conversions, which are then, as is shown below, replaced with
the one-way entailments A ` :I* and I ` :A*, or to keep the conversions, which
practically means eliminating the square structure. The former solution considers
A-type sentences false when ŒŒR D ;. It was adopted by Abelard (and implicitly by
Aristotle himself), reflected in AAPL. The latter solution considers A-type sentences
true when ŒŒR D ;. It was adopted by modern logic, under the guidance of, in par-
ticular Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), and became
the standard doctrine during the 20th century, defining standard modern predicate
logic (SMPL). Both are valid logical systems. The difference depends on the defini-
tion of the quantifying word all.9
It is shown below that SMPL, which keeps the conversions but drops the subal-
terns, leads to such an impoverished system that one can no longer speak of a square,
while AAPL, which keeps the subalterns but drops the conversions, though losing
some logical power compared with ABPL (the classic square), remains a fairly pow-
erful system.
3.2 The Hamiltonian triad of contraries The Scottish philosopher Sir William
Hamilton (1788–1856) developed a system of predicate logic, the Hamiltonian triad
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Figure 3 Hamilton’s triad of contraries expanded into the Blanché hexagon.
of contraries, one element of which consists in the positing of three mutually con-
trary sentence types, all Romans are mortal (type A); some but not all Romans are
mortal (type Y); and no Romans are mortal (type :I) (see Hamilton [4]).10 The
Hamiltonian triad is represented in Figure 3.a.
It should be noted that the Hamiltonian Y-vertex represents as a logical sentence
type, characterized by a special existential operator, what in the neo-Gricean litera-
ture is taken to be a pragmatically induced scalar implicature (“some but not all”).
This highlights the difference between the customary pragmatic approach and the
logical approach favored here. It will become clear further down that this logical ap-
proach has an explanatory potential that far exceeds the possibilities of the pragmatic
approach.
Hamilton was not worried about UEI: he simply assumed that ŒŒR ¤ ;. He
did not have to worry about UEI, because UEI does not vitiate his system, which,
the conversions not being part of it, is logically valid both with and without the
assumption that ŒŒR ¤ ;. The only difference is that, when cases where ŒŒR D ; are
taken into account, some logical (meta)relations are lost, whereas, when it is taken as
a precondition that ŒŒR ¤ ;, the system is complete in the sense that not a single pair
made up from the twelve possible expressions in the system is logically independent.
(The twelve possible expressions are: A, I, and Y, plus their external negations, their
internal negations, and their combined external and internal negations.)
The Hamiltonian triad can be extended to the Blanché logical hexagon in the
following way. The contradictory of Y, :Y, or, if you like, U, is A _ :I (A and :I
being the two remaining possibilities when Y is excluded, as shown in Figure 3.a);
hence A ` :Y and :I ` :Y; the contradictory of :I is I, semantically defined as
“there is at least one x such that both R.x/ andM.x/ are true”; since Y and :I are
contraries, :Y and I are subcontraries; likewise for the contrary pair A and Y, which
makes their negations :A and :Y subcontraries, and for the contrary pair A and :I,
which makes I and :A subcontraries. The original Hamiltonian triad of contraries
is thus extended with a triad of subcontraries. Moreover, given that the quantifying
word all is defined as “for all x such that R.x/ is true, M.x/ is also true, and there
is at least one x such that R.x/,” it follows that if A is true, I (defined as “there
is at least one x such that both R.x/ and M.x/ are true”) must also be true, which
establishes the subaltern entailment A ` I and hence, by contraposition, :I ` :A.
Finally, if it is assumed that ŒŒR ¤ ;, the conversions hold, as stated in Figure 3.b.
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Table 1 VS-model for the semantically independent sentences A, B, and C.
valuations (D Un): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A T F T F T F T F
B T T F F T T F F
C T T T T F F F F
4 Valuation Space Analysis
It has just been said that, as long as it is assumed that ŒŒR ¤ ;, no two of the twelve
sentence types in the Blanché hexagon are logically independent. (The same goes for
its subpart, ABPL, i.e., the square). To prove that these and other similar statements
are true would take a considerable amount of time and of intricate puzzling. Little
wonder that such theorems as these have never been systematically investigated in
the history of logic. To counter this problem (and for other reasons as well), I have
developed a system, called valuation space analysis (VS-analysis), a user-friendly
system that makes one see all those things at a glance. It is used a great deal in the
following. Here is how it works.11
First we need to know what is meant by valuation space. To make that clear,
we need to know what is meant by a valuation, and the best way to show that is by
means of a simple toy example. Take three contingent (i.e., neither necessarily true
nor necessarily false) and logically independent sentences, say, A, B, and C. In any
given situation, these are either true or false (the only truth values we work with:
strict bivalence). This gives 8 (23) possibilities, as shown in Table 1 (“T” stands for
true, “F” for false).12
Each column (from 1 to 8) represents a specific situation, also called valuation.
Together, they form the universe of discourse (Un) for A, B, and C. Now we give the
following definition of valuation space:
The valuation space (VS) /P/ of a sentence P is the set of valuations (situations)
in which P is valued true.
Given Table 1: =A= D ¹1; 3; 5; 7º,
=B= D ¹1; 2; 5; 6º,
=C= D ¹1; 2; 3; 4º.
Suppose that A, B, and C are not logically independent, for example, because
A ` C . In that case all valuations where A is true and C is false are ruled out,
or are inadmissible, on analytic grounds: such situations are per se impossible.
Therefore, if A ` C , the valuations 5 and 7 are inadmissible and are removed
from Un.
The logical compositions follow automatically, according to the well-known truth
tables. For example:
=:A= D ¹2; 4; 6; 8º, =A ^ :B= D ¹3; 7º,
=A ^ B= D ¹1; 5º, =:A _ B= D ¹1; 2; 4; 5; 6; 8º,
=A _ B= D ¹1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7º, =:.A ^ B/= D ¹2; 3; 4; 6; 7; 8º, and so on.
It is now easily seen that the metalogical relations are expressible in terms of VSs
(note that contradiction is the combination of contrariety and subcontrariety):
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Entailment: P ` Q if and only if =P=  =Q=;
Equivalence: P  Q if and only if =P= D =Q=;
Contrariety: PQ if and only if =P= \ =Q= D ;;
Subcontrariety: P Q if and only if =P= [ =Q= D Un;
Contradiction: Pj Q if and only if =P= \ =Q= D ; and
=P= [ =Q= D Un;
Logical independence: if and only if =P= \ =Q= ¤ ; ¤ P ¤ Q and
=P= [ =Q= ¤ Un.
At this point we need to be more specific as regards the internal structure of the
sentence types that we have so far identified as A, I, Y, and so on. To this end, we
use a variety of the language of generalized quantifiers, distinguishing a grammatical
category of quantifiers, which are treated as binary higher-order predicates, that is,
predicates over pairs of sets (or sets of sets, etc.). The customary symbol 8 (the
universal quantifier) is used for “all” and 9 (the inclusive existential quantifier) for
“some perhaps all.” For our special purpose, the symbol 9exc (the exclusive existential
quantifier) is added for “some but not all” or “only some.” Since 8, 9, and 9exc are
considered to be binary predicates, they have two terms, a subject term and an object
term. We take the matrix predicate M to form the subject term and the restrictor
predicate R to form the object term.13 The types A, A*, I, I*, Y, Y* now have the
following logical form:
A: 8x.Mx;Rx/, I: 9x.Mx;Rx/, Y: 9exc.Mx;Rx/,
A*: 8x.:Mx;Rx/, I*: 9x.:Mx;Rx/, Y*: 9exc.:Mx;Rx/.
The next step is to define the satisfaction conditions (meanings) of the quantifying
predicates. We do this in terms of set theory. For the purpose of the logical hexagon
and the square, the three quantifiers8 (“all”), 9 (“some perhaps all”), and 9exc (“some
but not all,” or “only some”) are defined as follows (the usual notation of denoting
the complement of X in any given domain of entities by a horizontal line above a
set-denoting expression is followed here):14
ŒŒ8 D ¹hY;Xi j X  Y and X ¤ ;º
(the extension of the binary higher-order predicate 8 is the set of
all pairs of sets hY;Xi such that X is included in or equal to Y ,
and X ¤ ;);
ŒŒ9 D ¹hY;Xi j Y \X ¤ ;º
(the extension of the binary higher-order predicate 9 is the set of
all pairs of sets hY;Xi such that the intersection of Y and X is
nonnull);
ŒŒ9exc D ¹hY;Xi j Y \X ¤ ; and NY \X ¤ ;º or
¹hY;Xi j Y \X ¤ ; ¤ Xº
(the extension of the binary higher-order predicate 9exc is the set of
all pairs of sets hY;Xi such that the intersection of Y and X is
nonnull and the intersection of NY and X is nonnull; alternatively,
the intersection of Y and X is nonnull and unequal to X ).
The various sentence types are assigned to valuation spaces according to their
truth conditions.15 We distinguish four spaces (leaving out, for the moment, a fifth
space for the unique situation of a null universe (Un D ;)), and we stipulate the
following:
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Space 1: is reserved for all valuations (situations) in Un where ŒŒR  ŒŒM  and
ŒŒR ¤ ;; that is, the set of entities denoted by the predicate R is nonnull and
is included in or equal to the set of entities denoted by the predicateM ;
Space 2: contains all valuations (situations) in Un, minus space 1, where ŒŒM 
and ŒŒR have a nonnull intersection: ŒŒM  \ ŒŒR ¤ ; ¤ ŒŒR; space 2
thus also contains the situations where ŒŒM   ŒŒR, but not those where
ŒŒR  ŒŒM , which belong exclusively in space 1;
Space 3: contains all valuations (situations) in Un where ŒŒM  and ŒŒR have a
null intersection and ŒŒR is nonnull: ŒŒR \ ŒŒM  D ; and ŒŒR ¤ ;;
Space 4: contains all valuations (situations) in Un where ŒŒR D ;.
Under these definitions, the sentence types at issue have the following VSs in Un:
=A= D ¹1º, =:A= D ¹2; 3; 4º, =A*= D ¹3º, =:A*= D ¹1; 2; 4º,
=I= D ¹1; 2º, =:I= D ¹3; 4º, =I*= D ¹2; 3º, =:I*= D ¹1; 4º,
=Y= D ¹2º, =:Y= D ¹1; 3; 4º, =Y*= D ¹2º, =:Y*= D ¹1; 3; 4º,
=U= D ¹1; 3; 4º, =:U= D ¹2º, =U*= D ¹1; 3; 4º, =:U*= D ¹2º.
Therefore, among the logical relations holding in Un (besides the contradictions
brought about by the negation) are the following:
A ` I ¹1º  ¹1; 2º, A:I ¹1º \ ¹3; 4º D ;,
A* ` I* ¹3º  ¹2; 3º, AI* ¹1º \ ¹2; 3º D ;,
A ` :I* ¹1º  ¹1; 4º, AA* ¹1º \ ¹3º D ;,
I ` :A* ¹1; 2º  ¹1; 2; 4º, IA* ¹1; 2º \ ¹3º D ;,
:I*A* ¹1; 4º \ ¹3º D ;,
:A I ¹2; 3; 4º [ ¹1; 2º D Un,
:A:A* ¹2; 3; 4º [ ¹1; 2; 4º D Un,
:A:I* ¹2; 3; 4º [ ¹1; 4º D Un,
:A*:I ¹1; 2; 4º [ ¹3; 4º D Un,
:A* I* ¹1; 2; 4º [ ¹2; 3º D Un.
Moreover,
Y  Y* because =Y= D =Y*= D ¹2º,
:Y  U because =:Y= D =U= D ¹1; 3; 4º,
U  U* because =U= D =U*= D ¹1; 3; 4º.
This system is consistent and free from UEI, but it does not have the conversions
since =A= D ¹1º ¤ =:I*= D ¹1; 4º, and =I= D ¹1; 2º ¤ :A*= D ¹1; 2; 4º.
Without theY- andU-vertices, it is the system originally conceived by Aristotle, until
it was streamlined into the logical square by later logicians, in particular Boethius,
and reconstructed by Abelard in the twelfth century (see note 8). In this system,
AAPL, A, and I are no longer duals (the conversions do not hold), as we have seen.
All that remains from duality are the one-way entailments A ` :I*, but not vice
versa, and I ` :A*, but not vice versa.
This analysis allows us to draw diagrams that show up immediately the meta-
logical relations holding between sentence types. We have two kinds of diagram,
VS-analyses (“ontological” diagrams) and polygonal representations of the logic
concerned (like the square notation). The classic Aristotelian–Boethian square of
opposition—with UEI and thus with the conversions—is represented in Figure 4.a
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Figure 4 The VS-model, the octagon, and the square for ABPL.
as a VS-model. Note that space 4 has been left empty in Figure 4.a, because cases
where ŒŒR D ; are not taken into account. That is, the system is not valid for all
possible situations and thus not analytically necessary: the fault of UEI (which by
itself does not mean that no inferences can be drawn, only that the inferences must
be indexed for the situation classes for which they are defined). In the octagonal rep-
resentation of Figure 4.b, each vertex stands for a sentence type. When every pair
of logically equivalent types is amalgamated into one vertex, the square of ABPL
results, as shown in Figure 4.c.16
When we do the same for AAPL (the square but without the conversions), we get
Figure 5. Since Figure 5.b contains no equivalence relations, it cannot be reduced.
Note that the octagon of Figure 5.b is “poorer” than that of Figure 4.b, which is
complete in that each pair of vertices is connected by some (meta)relation other than
logical independence.
Now we repeat this operation for standard modern predicate logic (SMPL), often
called Russellian logic. The only difference with AAPL is that, in AAPL, the uni-
versal quantifier 8 is defined with the condition that ŒŒR ¤ ; so that A-type and
A*-type sentences are considered false in space 4, whereas in SMPL 8 is defined
without that condition, so that A and A* are considered true—very much against
natural intuitions. This small difference has massive consequences for the logic, as
one can see from Figure 6. The only (meta)logical relations that have been left are
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Figure 5 The VS-model and the octagon for AAPL.
Figure 6 The VS-model and what remains of the octagon and the square for SMPL.
contradictoriness and equivalence, with the result that there is massive logical inde-
pendence. The square has completely disappeared. This dramatic impoverishment
has led to the disturbing fact that current textbooks of logic no longer make mention
of the logical metarelations discussed above, with the exception of contradictoriness
and equivalence, even though they are the backbone of any logical theory.
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Figure 7 The VS-model, the dodecagon, and the hexagon for RGNPL.
We now do the same for the Hamiltonian triad of contraries and its extension, the
Blanché logical hexagon, shown in Figure 3.b above. Here, we have twelve sentence
types: A, Y, :I, plus their external negations, their internal negations, and their
external plus internal negations. The logical language used is the same as above; so
are the semantic definitions of the quantifiers 8, 9, and 9exc. Space 4 is left out of
account, so that the system has existential import and the conversions hold.
Figure 7.b looks forbidding, yet it is merely the dodecagon resulting from Fig-
ure 7.a. It contains six equivalences (all on the outer edges). When these are amalga-
mated into a single vertex, the result is the hexagon of Figure 7.c, which is identical
to that of Figure 3.b. The Blanché hexagon is thus derivable both from the clas-
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Figure 8 The VS-model for UGNPL, where ŒŒR D ; is taken into account.
sic square and from the Hamiltonian triad. In fact, the Boethian square and the
Hamiltonian triad are both part of an overarching system, represented by the Blanché
hexagon, for cases where ŒŒR ¤ ;. They differ only in that each system has made its
own selection from the six available vertices: A, I, :I, :A for the square and A, Y,
:I for the Hamiltonian triad.
The logic corresponding to the Blanché hexagon, which encompasses the square
and the Hamiltonian triad, is henceforth called generalized natural predicate logic
(GNPL). Like the square, it has two forms, one without and one with existential im-
port, depending, respectively, on whether space 4 is or is not taken into account. The
variety with existential import—that is, without space 4—I call restricted general-
ized natural predicate logic (RGNPL). The variety without existential import—that
is, with space 4 operative—I call unrestricted generalized natural predicate logic
(UGNPL).
When space 4 is taken into account, the semantic definitions given for 8, 9, and
9exc make A, A*, I, I*, Y, and Y* false (see Figure 8). This means that most of the
equivalences of Figure 7.b are gone. Only the equivalent pairs Y and Y*, and thus
:Y and :Y*, remain intact. With ŒŒR D ; taken into account, the dodecagon of
Figure 7.b is thus reducible to a decagon, which, however, is not presented here as a
separate figure.
It is clear from the above that ABPL (the traditional square), AAPL, the Hamil-
tonian triad, and the Blanché hexagon all belong to the same family of logics, which
we have called generalized natural predicate logic or GNPL. All logics belonging
to GNPL have the universal quantifier 8 defined in such a way that the A and A*
sentence types are false when ŒŒR D ;, which conforms to natural intuition. SMPL
does not belong to this family, as SMPL takes the A and A* sentence types to be true
when ŒŒR D ;. It is my contention that the natural logic of mankind is to be sought
within RGNPL, cases where ŒŒR D ; (and other kinds of presupposition failure)
being accounted for by a trivalent presuppositional logic serving as a protective
envelope around the bivalent default cases (see [18, Chapter 10] and Section 5.2
below).
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What all this shows is that the square, the Hamiltonian triad, the Blanché hexagon,
and in general all logics falling under UGNPL are sound systems of logic, where
UEI does not rear its head. UEI begins to play a role the moment equivalences
are stated. The square is sound without the equivalences known as the conversions.
The same goes for the other logics belonging to the GNPL family. The addition of
space 4 destroys most equivalences and thus makes the logics at issue poorer, but the
systems as such, with all their logical metarelations between pairs of sentence types,
are sound. The interesting, and most relevant, point is that maximal power for a
logical system is attained when space 4 is not taken into account—which is precisely
what natural language and natural logic do: nature has found a way to maximize
logical efficiency by confining bivalence to cases where ŒŒR ¤ ;, no doubt for good
functional reasons, reflected in the ontogenesis of predicate logic, as argued below.
A further interesting point, more directly relevant to logic as a discipline, is the
following. It was said above that any logical system is defined by its axioms, the
ranges of its variables, and the semantic definitions of its operators. When we take
the traditional Aristotelian–Boethian square of opposition, which is a restricted sys-
tem of the GNPL family, we see that it is not possible to define the universal quantifier
8 in the set-theoretic manner presented above. With the condition that ŒŒR ¤ ;, the
result is AAPL; without that condition the result is SMPL. The traditional square,
with its conversions, cannot be defined in such a way that it follows from the seman-
tic definitions of its quantifiers: the conversions have to be added as an extraneous
condition, which violates the charter for a good logical system. Nevertheless, this
highly understandable error has given high profile to the fact that natural logic oper-
ates within the restricting condition that ŒŒR ¤ ;.
5 How Cognition Plays Its Part in Natural Logic
5.1 From not all to some but not all We have come some way toward accounting for
the discrepancies between standard predicate logic and natural logical intuitions, yet
we are not quite there. Some light has been shed on the ambiguity of natural language
some, which means both “some perhaps all” (the I-vertex) and “some but not all” (the
Y-vertex), in that the latter is made to represent a basic-natural operator forming part
of the Hamiltonian triad of contraries, while the former can be retrieved through
more sophisticated reflection. The natural language universal quantifier all has been
restored to a status of logical respect in that it has been shown to fit into a family
of faultless and efficient logical systems, the family of RGNPL. The conversions,
which would be lost to the RGNPL family under strict bivalence, have been saved
by relegating cases where ŒŒR D ; to a nondefault area of predicate logic requiring
a marked discourse-correcting, radical negation to produce truth (see note 9 and
below), a trivalent presuppositional solution elaborated and presented in [18] and
earlier publications by the same author. Yet, so far, we have been unable to account
for the intuition that (1) and (2) are felt to be equivalent.
(1) Not all flags are green.
(2) Some flags are green, and some flags are not green.
In none of the logical systems discussed are they equivalent, nor does it look as if
any logical system with the standard bivalent negation : will be able to make them
equivalent.
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At this stage of our investigation, the nonequivalence of (1) and (2) in all known
logical systems is thus our main stumbling block, which may make it look as if the
pragmatic account has an edge over the logical account proposed here. The standard
pragmatic argument used to be that this equivalence follows from the Gricean first
maxim of quantity (see Grice [3, p. 45]), which says, “Make your contribution as
informative as is required.” This, however, makes the application of this maxim
dependent on ad hoc situational features, whereas the intuitive equivalence of (1) and
(2) is, though situation-dependent in a logical sense, independent of ad hoc features
in any given situation. Levinson [11, p. 35] cuts out the situational variability and
translates the maxim as his “Q-principle”: “What isn’t said, isn’t.” This principle,
however, quickly leads to absurdity. Consider a sentence like Kevin left yesterday.
According to the Q-principle, this should pragmatically implicate “Kevin did not
leave yesterday morning,” as yesterday morning is more informative (more specific
and thus stronger) than yesterday. But by the same token, Kevin left yesterday should
pragmatically implicate “Kevin did not leave yesterday afternoon,” “Kevin did not
leave yesterday evening,” and “Kevin did not leave last night.” This would amount
to an overall pragmatic implicature from Kevin left yesterday to “Kevin did not leave
yesterday,” which is absurd. The pragmatic literature is unclear on this score, but
both Grice’s first maxim, “Make your contribution as informative as is required,”
and Levinson’s rendering of it in the form of his Q-principle seem untenable.
Grice’s first maxim was shored up by associating it with scalar implicatures in
the sense that, given a sentence . . .X . . . , where X has a certain position on an im-
plicational scale of increasing strength or restrictedness, the negation of . . .X . . . is
taken to conversationally implicate the negation of all sentences . . .Y . . . where Y is
stronger than (entails) X . This means that Levinson’s pragmatic Q-principle, “What
isn’t said, isn’t,” should be restricted to “What isn’t said by means of a stronger or
entailing expression, isn’t.” But this modification again hits the wall of absurdity.
If Kevin ate some of the food is taken to pragmatically implicate “Kevin did not eat
all of the food,” because the speaker would have used the stronger expression all the
food if she or he could have vouched for that, then the implicatures “Kevin did not
eat most/half/much/a little/. . . of the food” should likewise be generated by this sen-
tence, so that Kevin ate some of the food should pragmatically implicate “Kevin ate
none of the food,”
Scalar orderings of predicates were developed before Grice by Jespersen [10,
pp. 85–86] and Blanché [1, pp. 122–26], [2, pp. 110–19], likewise with the purpose
of accounting for the restricted meaning of the negation over scalar expressions. Ac-
cording to Jespersen, there is a cognitive scale from “none” via “some but not all” to
“all.” The negation of all would then “cut off” the head of the scale and leave “some
but not all,” or, in Jespersen’s own, somewhat quaint, language “in negativing an A
[that is, an A-type sentence; P. A. M. Seuren] it is the absolute element of A that is
negatived” (see [10, p. 86]). This, however, will not do, as taking off the “absolute el-
ement” of all leaves one with most, so that not all would suggest (“implicate”) most,
which it clearly does not.
Moreover, Jespersen’s reasoning requires that other semantic scales should gen-
erate corresponding “implicatures,” which does not seem to be the case. Consider,
for example, in the realm of colors, the scale from black via grey to white, or, in
the realm of temperature, from cold via warm to hot, or, in the realm of water oc-
curring in nature, from fresh via brackish to salt, or, in the realm of light, from
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dark via dusky to bright, or, in the realm of food, from bland via savory to spicy.
These do not seem to generate intuitions analogous to (1) and (2) above—certainly
not with the strength of (1) and (2), where the intuition has the quality of a mutual
entailment. Not white does not suggest grey, excluding black; not hot does not sug-
gest warm, excluding cold,17 nor does not salt suggest brackish, excluding fresh; not
bright does not suggest dusky, excluding dark, nor does not spicy suggest savory, ex-
cluding bland. By contrast, expressions like not quite white, not quite hot, not quite
salt, not quite bright, not quite spicy clearly do suggest “white/hot/salt/bright/spicy to
some extent.” But then, English not quite is a representative of the negated universal
quantifier (German nicht ganz, French pas complètement). It does seem, therefore,
that any proposed quantificational scale stands out from other possible scales.
When we look at the enormous pragmaticist literature on the subject, we must
come to the sobering conclusion that the combination of the Gricean first maxim of
quantity with the (in fact, Jespersonian) notion of scalar implicatures has not yielded
a solution to the intuitive equivalence of (1) and (2). The discussion in Horn [5,
pp. 231–45] is illuminating as regards the history of the problem, as it deals critically
with a wide range of literature, some of the critique being directed at his own seminal
dissertation Horn [6], but it does not provide an answer. Since no better or more
specific proposal from pragmaticist quarters has seen the light, one may conclude
that pragmatic approaches in general have failed to provide a valid, principled answer.
Pragmatics thus has no edge over the logical approach as regards the intuitively felt
equivalence of (1) and (2).
Let us, therefore, forge ahead on the so far only partially explored logical front.
As long as not is taken to be a complement selector within a universe of discourse
(Un) that remains constant for the logical system as a whole, as is done in all
logical systems, the intuitive equivalence relation between (1) and (2) remains
unexplained.18 This does not mean, however, that we are at the end of our logi-
cal Latin, since logic has so far not, or insufficiently, explored the role of Un in
logical systems, in particular the consequences of progressive restriction of Un as
discourse proceeds (presupposition theory) or in the course of concept formation,
which is our primary concern in the present study. From a formal point of view,
it is easily shown that all metalogical relations may be affected when the class of
situations in which a logical system holds—its Un—is restricted from a larger to a
smaller size.
We shall have a look at that in a moment. First, we wish to observe that this point
of view is fruitful from a functional cognitive perspective. Humans, in their often in-
tricate daily business, do not conduct their thinking in the terms of a philosophically
and mathematically constructed, highly abstract universe of all possible situations, a
universe of discourse we call Un! . Ordinary life efficiency requires that cognition
should operate in terms of highly restricted, ad hoc “universes of discourse,” where
available contextual, situational, and world knowledge help to determine reference
relations established by definite noun phrases (that man, the house on the corner),
where words can be used that are made for specific classes of situations and thus
induce presuppositions (e.g., be divorced, inducing the presupposition that the sub-
ject was married before, or come back, inducing the presupposition that the subject
has gone away), and where words expressing logical concepts (all, some, etc.) can
be kept within the limits imposed by such contextually and situationally restricted
universes of discourse.
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To account for such Un-restriction we posit three assumptions:
(a) There is a species-specific basic-natural level of cognitive development
attained by all (not mentally handicapped) human beings without any
culture-driven refinement or schooling. The formation of basic-natural con-
cepts, including basic-natural logical concepts, and attendant basic-natural
(monomorphemic) lexicalizations found in natural languages all over the
world, takes place at this species-specific level of development.
(b) As part of the human basic-natural ontogenetic cognitive development, an
implicit, nondeclarative, and probably universal system of logic comes into
being with inbuilt means to restrict any universe of discourse Un to what
is needed for any here-and-now purpose at hand. This Un-restriction takes
two interrelated forms: (i) conceptual, in that concepts (and the correspond-
ing lexical predicates) are made to function in terms of semantically defined
restricted Uns for the negation to select a complement in, and (ii) discourse-
semantic, in that, due to the semantics of the main predicate, every successive
utterance in a coherent discourse brings about a corresponding restriction of
the running Un, again for the negation to select a complement in. A presup-
position is a lexically induced semantic condition on a sentence making it
suitable for use only in those discourses where that condition is satisfied and
unsuitable in others. Presuppositions are thus Un-restrictors par excellence.
This basic-natural logical system, complete with inbuilt devices for domain
restriction, determines what we take to be “natural intuitions” of entailment,
contrariety, and equivalence.
(c) Logic, as a cognitive faculty of individuals, goes through stages not only of
ontogenetic but also of cultural development. Culture-induced sophistication
leads to higher degrees of explicitness, abstractness, systematicity, and gener-
ality, culminating in modern, mathematics-based logic in terms of an abstract,
unrestricted Un! .
In this perspective, the study of natural logic becomes an empirical enterprise
within the overall theoretical framework of the metalogical relations. When we look
at the history of logic in the Western world, we see the progress from minimal to
maximal sophistication mentioned in (c) happen before our eyes, and at the same time
we see the ecological functionality of “primitive” logic in the context of mundane
everyday business mentioned in (b). On these assumptions, the social and cognitive
reality of natural languages and the resulting intuitions that serve as empirical data
provide an important entrance gate to the hidden mysteries of the logical workings
of the mind.
That being so, the question arises of what happens to a logical system when its
Un is restricted from Un! to a more restricted universe UnR. An immediate conse-
quence, which plays a central role in the analysis, is that the negation selects different
complements as Un gets more restricted. This is expressed in the fact (already ob-
served by Aristotle) that negative morphological prefixes such as un-, dis-, in-, non-,
expressing an opposition between intrinsically positive and negative concepts, typ-
ically function within restricted pairs of opposites and thus select complements in
highly restricted UnRs. For example, my neighbor’s dog may not be a Catholic, but
he does not count as a non-Catholic: the morphological incorporation of the negation
into the composite form non-Catholic automatically restricts the complement of the
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negation to the set of entities that satisfy the presupposition induced by the predi-
cate Catholic which, when used as a count noun, requires presuppositionally that the
subject term referent be a human being.
This domain-restrictedness applies likewise to the negation when expressed as an
independent word, but with gradations. While negative morphological elements are
“minimal” in that they are strictly limited to the minimal UnR at hand, the full nega-
tion word not is allowed to be used in a “radical” sense, in that it may, in principle,
fall back on less-restricted domains as a result of reflection. Thus we can say, My
brother has not come back: he has never been away, where the negation not cancels
the presupposition that the speaker’s brother has been away. Or indeed we can say
My neighbor’s dog is not a Catholic, where not breaks through the restricted Un
of humans. Yet this license of the negation word not to break through the minimal
UnR at hand and fall back on an earlier, less restricted, Un is limited by principles
of universal grammar. In fact, it seems that the license of being used “radically” is
restricted to the negation as a free syntactic element and as a possible addition to
any given (assertive) sentence S, occupying the so-called “canonical position” in S.
English has the negation canonically as the head of the auxiliary constituent that goes
with the main verb. But when the negation is not the highest sentential operator, or
is in any way incorporated into a set expression (idiom), for example, because it is
required by a negative polarity item (NPI), or has become part of the morphology,
it has no choice but to be “minimal,” that is, to select its complement within the
minimal UnR at hand, being unable to fall back on any earlier, less restricted Un.
5.2 A brief excursion on presuppositions It is not my purpose, in the present study,
to elaborate the detailed conditions for the independent negation word not to be used
in a marked “radical” sense, restoring the current UnR to a less restricted phase in
the flow of discourse when a presupposition has been violated (for a full discussion
of the presuppositional aspect of this problem, see Seuren [15, pp. 214–313], [18,
pp. 334–54]). Yet, in order not to leave the reader completely in the dark as regards
this aspect of the analysis, a brief indication is in order of what is at issue. The anal-
ysis developed in [15] and [18], and many other of my publications in between these
two, implies that the fact that not selects different complements according to whether
it is used “minimally” or “radically,” requires a truth-conditional distinction between
minimal and radical falsity and hence a violation of the Aristotelian principle of strict
bivalence. Minimal not by definition preserves presuppositional entailments, since
it is these entailments that produce Un-restrictions during discourse (in Seuren [14],
my first publication on presupposition theory, I used the term flexible universe of
interpretation; see Seuren [16, p. 304]).
Empirical support for the thesis that the distinction between minimal and radical
negation is of a logico-semantic and not of a pragmatic nature and is governed by
grammatical principles comes from cases like (3) to (5), where not takes the whole
rest of the sentence as its scope yet is per se presupposition preserving (!! stands for
semantic incongruity with the preceding sentence):
(3) Not only Jack laughed. (!! Jack didn’t laugh.)
(4) That her son is gay does not worry the queen. (!! Her son is not gay.)
(5) What worries the queen is not that her son is gay. (!! Nothing worried the
queen.)
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In these three sentences, the presuppositions cannot be canceled by not, even though
not takes scope over the whole rest of the sentence. In (3), the presupposition that
Jack laughed cannot be canceled by not, owing to the fact that not occurs in a non-
canonical position. Sentence-initial not thus seems to function as if it were a negative
morphological prefix. In (4), the factive presupposition that the queen’s son is gay
cannot be canceled by not on account of the general but so far unexplained fact that
when a factive that-clause stands in its proper subject position and is not extraposed
(as in It does not worry the queen that . . . , where presupposition canceling is possi-
ble), sentence negation cannot cancel the factive presupposition. In (5), the presup-
position that something worries the queen is uncancellable by not owing to the fact
that the negation over cleft or pseudocleft constructions is necessarily presupposition
preserving (for reasons that can only be intuited given the present state of our knowl-
edge). Facts such as these show that minimal and radical not are truth-conditionally
distinct. This necessitates the assumption of a trivalent logic, which is best taken to
be classically bivalent for any current restricted universe UnR but requires the value
“radically false” for propositions that violate the boundaries of UnR. Radical not
then generates truth by saying, in effect, that the sentence in question contains a pre-
supposition violation. It is in this sense that we can say (see also note 9 above) that
the bivalent logic of the square is maintained for restricted default Uns and that a
radical negation operator is called in for nondefault cases where a given restricted
UnR must be rolled back to a less-restricted Un.
The upshot is that we are looking for a solution to the problem posed by the
sentences (1) and (2) in terms of Un-restriction. In particular, we wish to establish
a rationale that explains why not all flags are green is restricted in such a way that
not only cases where there are no flags but also cases where no flags are green are
excluded.
5.3 Polarity division Let us revert now to the question of the logical consequences
of Un-restriction as found in natural language. Besides the complement selection of
negation, which has just been discussed in some detail, a relation of contrariety in
a larger Un may become one of contradictoriness in a more restricted Un: PQ
becomes Pj Q when Un is restricted to =P= [ =Q=. Similar changes occur with
other logical metarelations. Thus, when P ` Q in a larger Un, the entailment is
strengthened to the corresponding equivalence P  Q when Un is restricted to
=P=: given that P ` Q means that =P=  =Q=, when Un is restricted to =P=,
=P= D =Q=; hence P  Q within UnR. Likewise for the logical independence of
P andQ (=P= and =Q=mutually partially intersect while =P=[=Q= ¤ Un), which
turns into subcontrariety when the condition =P= [ =Q= ¤ Un is scrapped and Un
is restricted to =P= [ =Q=. In general, equivalence, contradictoriness, subcontra-
riety, and logical independence depend on the size of Un, whereas entailment and
contrariety hold independently of the size of Un, though they may be strengthened
to equivalence and contradictoriness, respectively, when Un is restricted.
Given this, we posit the hypothesis that the cognitive generative process of polar-
ity division is an active force in the coming about of conceptual, including logical,
structures.
Polarity Division
Either pole of a binary opposition of sentence types may, as a result of increased
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cognitive activity, be split up into two mutually exclusive poles. The new, more
restricted opposition forms a new, more restricted Un separated from the less
restricted Un by a median that fences off the smaller from the larger Un.
Given a binary opposition of sentence types hK;:Ki or, as the case may be, hK;Ki
(where the symbol  stands for negation within some restricted UnR), one, or pos-
sibly both of the two poles, usually the nonnegative one K, can give rise to a new
binary opposition hK1;K1i, forming a new, more restricted UnR. Such polarity di-
vision is the result of further cognitive activity, such as further analysis or increased
knowledge, around the expanded pole K. Cognitively, the original K-pole recedes
into the background (often gaining presuppositional status), and the subject now op-
erates in terms of the three contrary poles (vertices) K1, K1, and :K. Yet the
original K-pole can be retrieved by conscious, explicit thinking. There is thus a cog-
nitive asymmetry in the new triad of contraries, in that K1 and K1 belong together
while :K is the odd one out.
The process is illustrated in Figure 9.a in the ontological terms of valuation spaces
and in Figure 9.b in the logical terms of polygonal representations. Once such a
Figure 9 The transition from a binary to a quaternary opposition, incorporating a
triad of contraries.
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Figure 10 Reduction of Figure 9.b to the traditional square and the Blanché hexagon.
division has taken place, the boundary between the two original opposites fencing in
the new UnR is called the median.
Assuming that the point of departure is Un! , so that the complement of =K= is
=:K=, and assuming that K is split up intoK1 andK1, it follows that both K1 and
K1 entailK and that K1 andK1, which are contraries inUn! , are contradictories
in the more restricted UnR1 formed by =K=. Figure 9.b shows that the original binary
opposition hK;:Ki has been extended to a quadrilateral structure, henceforth called
a kite, which, in the original terms of Un! , incorporates a triangle of contraries. At
this stage of development, the triad hK1;K1;:Ki is cognitively prominent, and the
original K-vertex has receded into the background, from where it is retrievable by
intellectual reflection.
One notes that the kite only contains the relations of entailment, contrariety, and
contradiction, not the highly counterintuitive relation of subcontrariety. When the
kite of Figure 9.b is rearranged into the square format, as in Figure 10.a, one finds
that there is no place for a K1-vertex, as the square format has only one contrariety
relation, that between K1 and :K. By contrast, the hexagon format of Figure 10.b
allows for all relations of Figure 9.b to be represented but adds a few more, making
the picture complete, with the K1-vertex standing for the Blanché Y-vertex and
the :K1-vertex for the Blanché U-vertex. The kite of Figure 9.b is present in
the quadruple hK1;K;K1;:Ki of Figure 10.b. The two vertices that have been
added to the kite are :K1 and :K1, which have been circled in Figure 10.b. The
reason for singling out the vertices:K1 and:K1 (Blanché’sU-vertex) is that these
two select a complement outside their UnR. This is not so for the :K-vertex, which
selects its complement within the higher order Un, perhapsUn! , but:K1 and:K1
per se reach back into a Un of a higher order, as is signaled by the combination of :
and a subscript under K.
This is relevant for the following reason. It has been observed that there is a
virtually universal lexical asymmetry in natural languages in that there are basic
(monomorphemic) lexicalizations for the A-, I-, and E (D I)-vertices (resp., all,
some, and no in English) but not for the O-vertex (not all). The first author known
to have made this observation was Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274) in his Expositio
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Peryermeneias (liber 1, lectio 10, nota 13, www.corpusthomisticum.org/cpe.html;
see [6, Chapter 4], [5, p. 253], Jaspers [9, p. 15]), followed some time later by
Blanché [1, pp. 95–6], Horn [6, Chapter 4], [5, pp. 252–62], Löbner [12, p. 95],
Levinson [11, pp. 69–71], Jaspers [9], Seuren [18, pp. 114–21], and others. The
O-vertex is represented in Figure 10.b by :K1, which, as we have seen, contravenes
the stipulated restriction that, in basic cognition, the negation selects its complement
within the nearest Un. That the U (D :K1)-vertex commits the same sin was
observed recently by Dany Jaspers, in the context of renewed interest in the tradi-
tional square and in the works of Robert Blanché [1], [2] and a few other forgotten
authors, such as Paul Jacoby [7], [8] and Augustin Sesmat [13], who were unhappy
with the summary dismissal of traditional predicate logic by Bertrand Russel and
modern mathematical logicians in general.
The pragmatic answer to this lexical asymmetry (see [6, Chapter 4], [11,
pp. 69–71]) amounts to the following chain of reasoning. Exclusive some (the
Y-vertex) results from the Gricean first maxim of quantity (see [3, p. 45]) reinforced
by scalar implicatures (see above). Since exclusive some is pragmatically equivalent
with some-not (the O-vertex), and since lexicalization generally favors positive
rather than negative concepts, there is no need for a lexicalization of the O-vertex.
However, it has been argued above that this pragmaticist solution is insufficient. We
may add here that this answer also fails to explain the universal nonlexicalization of
the U-vertex. Finally, since the nonlexicalization of the O- and U-vertices is just one
instance of a general feature of the lexicons of languages as a whole, which system-
atically never lexicalize negatives across medians, and since the pragmatic answer
given by Horn and Levinson has no bearing on the nonlogical cases of systematic
nonlexicalization, it seems that this pragmatic answer must be rejected.19
The answer given in Seuren [18, pp. 114–21] is likewise insufficient. Seuren
argues that in the basic-natural triad of contraries no is not a lexicalization of
“not-(exclusive)-some,” which would yield the meaning “all or no” (i.e. the
U-vertex). Therefore, there is no reason to expect any lexicalization for “not-all”
in the O-vertex: the problem does not arise. While this is in itself correct, it fails
to explain the corresponding lexical gaps systematically found outside the various
logical systems.
The answer proposed here is based on Jaspers [9]. Jaspers found the opening to
the solution elaborated here, in that he proposed a cognitive hierarchy in the vertices
of the classic square such that I is cognitively opposed to not-I in a larger Un but
A is cognitively opposed to not-A in a smaller Un defined by I, excluding not-I. He
then proposed a lexicalization principle according to which lexicalizations of com-
plements cannot cross a border into a larger Un but have to stay within their own
(sub)division. This prevents a lexicalization of :A and thus of I*. This inspired
hypothesis seems to be the correct answer. It covers the nonlexicalization of both the
O- and the U-vertices and of corresponding vertices for all lexically induced opposi-
tion relations and thus has by far the greatest explanatory power of all explanations
proposed so far. Moreover, it allows for the design of a model for the ontogenesis of
natural logic.
Consider the cognitive state of a human being around birth. The very first sensory
impression will result in the sensation that “there is something out there,” as against
“there is nothing.” Repeated events of this nature will lead to the discovery of qual-
itative differences or properties, such as between moving and still entities, between
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Figure 11 The ontogenesis of predicate logic in terms of successive Un-restriction.
individual entities and backgrounds, between entities that feed and those that do not,
between noise and silence, and so on. At a further stage, the infant will start gener-
alizing over properties (that is, she or he will start quantifying), noticing that some
entities with property R also have propertyM , or that no entity R also has property
M . Then, the infant will discover that, so far, all, or not all, entities R also have
propertyM . This process is schematically predicted in Figure 11.
For example, the infant finds that some entities “out there” produce noises but
others do not. This is stage b in Figure 12, repeated over and over for a number
of entities and a number of properties. At stage c, the infant gets sensitized to the
fact that one particular entity not only makes noises but also feeds and causes a
sensation of well-being, while other entities do other things. That is, in virtue of
an inbuilt program, the infant starts to spread properties over individuals, inductively
categorizing the spread patterns into the binary concepts of (inclusive) “some” versus
its opposite “none” in propositional thought structures, thus creating the types I and
I (see Figure 12.c). At stage d, the I-pole of the I vs I opposition is expanded
into a further opposition between a tentatively inductive “all” (A) and an empirically
established “not-all” (A  Y), whereby both A andA entail I, causing (“undue”)
existential import. Figure 12.e represents a potential further subdivision of the A–Y
opposition creating a hypothetical UnR4 in which not-all (Y) has been split up into
many R is M and few (D not many) R is M. Whether this is indeed a valid extension
of the system cannot be discussed here, but, given our present insights, it cannot be
excluded.
This development is schematically represented in Figure 11, which shows the suc-
cessive restrictions from Un! to UnR3, at which point the concepts expressed in I-,
I-, A-, and Y (DA)-type sentences have come into being. The existential import
of these sentence types and the subaltern entailment A ` I are now seen to result
from the cognitive process we have called polarity division. Figure 12 shows the
same in terms of polygonal representations (kites).
One notes that what is traditionally called the E-vertex represents I, which se-
lects its complement within UnR2, not :I, which does so within Un! . While I en-
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Figure 12 The ontogenesis of predicate logic in terms of logical diagrams.
tails that ŒŒR ¤ ;;:I has no such entailment. We may take it that natural language
default not represents , not :. Through the ages, logicians have not observed this
distinction and have, unwittingly, created a new, artificial not doing its work within
the philosophically constructed Un! . Yet in the square, the vertex denoted by E or
not-I entails that ŒŒR ¤ ;, but in systems where space 4 is taken into account no
such entailment exists.
The procedure of polarity division has thus generated the quadrilateral system
represented in Figure 13.a, which has the kite structure of Figure 9.b. Further logical
reflection in terms of Un! adds the :A and :Y .D U/ vertices shown in Figure13.b,
both carrying the negation :. It is precisely these two added vertices that escape
basic-natural lexicalization. The solution proposed in the first instance in Jaspers [9]
is thus dramatically confirmed.20
It should be noted that, in this new, most basic-natural system of predicate logic,
the minimal negation  selects its complement within the restricted UnR of its argu-
ment. That is, =I= is the complement of =I= within the opposition I vs I, while
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Figure 13 The basic-natural kite structure, extended to the hexagon by reflection.
Figure 14 VS-analysis and corresponding kite of the most basic natural predicate
logic.
=A= is the complement of =A=within the opposition A vsA .D Y/, jointly form-
ing =I=.21 This produces the VS-analysis of Figure 14.a, which has an added space
5 for the logically possible situation, not considered earlier, of a null universe. Here
spaces 5 and 4 are not filled in because only the restricted negation  is considered,
space 3 is filled in only for (the minimal negation of) I and for I*, and the sentence
types A, Y, A*, Y*, and their minimal negations are valued only for spaces 1 and 2.
In Figure 14, A, Y, and I are still contraries, since =A= D ¹1º, =Y= D ¹2º, and
=I= D ¹3º, though the contrariety of A and Y has been strengthened to contradic-
tion due to polarity division, and the subaltern entailment still holds for A ` I, but
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that, therefore, the entailment A* ` I* should likewise hold cannot be expressed,
since the UnR for universally quantified sentences consists of just the spaces 1 and
2, while A* is true only in space 3, leaving perfectly grammatical sentences of the
type all Romans are not mortal without a semantics, the only remedy being a nega-
tivization of the predicate, all Romans are nonmortal, which is an A-type sentence.
This is why it took some nontrivial reflection to arrive at the entailment A* ` I*,
expressible in terms of the Blanché hexagon shown in Figure 3 above. For the same
reason, the conversions are expressible only partially. Figure 14 shows that the equiv-
alences A  I* and I  A* are expressed, since =A= D =I*= D ¹1º and
=I= D =A*= D ¹1; 2º. But the equivalences A*  I and A  I* can-
not be expressed. These gaps had to be filled in by further logical reflection, ulti-
mately leading to the Blanché hexagon. Without such reflection, A  Y, since
=A= D =Y= D ¹2º.
The logic displayed in Figure 14 is, so to speak, a system with sliding panels,
which surely makes this system logically unsound, as it is not valid for all possible
situations, but no less interesting for that. I take it that this system is the most basic
system of natural logic found in human nature—more basic even than the Hamil-
tonian triad. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of logic can be seen as a
progressive filling in, interrupted by setbacks, for all the sentence types involved,
of the gaps left by the VS-analysis of Figure 14.a. This labor involved the search
for a unified, nonflexible Un! for predicate logic as a whole, covering all possible
situations and thus attaining the status of analytical necessity. The classic square of
opposition unified its Un and filled in all the gaps up to space 4 (where ŒŒR D ;) for
the sentence types A and I plus their internal and external negations. The Hamilton-
ian triad did the same for the sentence types A, Y, and E (D I) plus their internal
and external negations. Both standard modern logic and Aristotelian–Abelardian
logic unified their Un and filled in all the gaps including space 5 (provided the logic
is formulated in terms of generalized quantifiers),22 thus arriving at the one and only
Un! for the sentence types A and I plus their internal and external negations. The
Blanché hexagon, when extended to cover cases where ŒŒR D ; and formulated in
terms of generalized quantifiers, finishes the task for the sentence types A, I, and Y
plus their internal and external negations.
This not only solves the problem of the intuitively felt equivalence of the sentences
(1) (not all flags are green) and (2) (some flags are green and some flags are not
green) quoted above but also the general problem of the intuitive clashes of natural
logical intuitions with standard modern predicate logic. All it took, in hindsight, was
the construction of the logic spontaneously developing in human beings, which has
been shown to be incomplete but extendable to at least two universally valid forms
of predicate logic: standard modern and Aristotelian–Abelardian predicate logic.
6 Some Final Observations
A recurrent feature of quadrilateral lexical systems such as those shown in Fig-
ure 13.a is that the UnR that acts as an umbrella for a new opposition recedes to
presuppositional status. Thus, the I- and I-vertices of Figure 12.d presuppose that
ŒŒR ¤ ;, and so do the subsequent subdivisions A and A. How general this phe-
nomenon is in lexicons as a whole is a question that has not yet been investigated
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systematically. But it can be observed at this point that similar recessions to presup-
positional status are found in, for example, the items of the complex crime, illegal,
legal, offense (see note 19), which all presuppose that there is penal law. Likewise for
the complex consisting of bachelor, single, spinster, married, which all presuppose
a common UnR where the subject referents of these predicates are adult humans and
where there is a socially sanctioned institution of marriage.
A further recurrent, but by no means universal, feature is that lexical items in the
I-position tend to be of a more technical or academic nature and thus outside or above
the register of common usage. Thus, the word sibling, in the I-position of the kite,
belongs to a more legal or technical register than the words brother and sister, which
occupy two vertices of the triad of contraries hbrother; sister; parenti. Likewise for
animal, which, in the I-position, belongs to an academic register covering human
and nonhuman animals, while in the Y-position it covers only nonhuman animals.
This can be ascribed to the fact, mentioned earlier, that the pole which is split up into
two subpoles, thereby creating a more restricted Un, recedes into the background so
that the subject now operates in terms of the remaining triad of contraries. The “for-
gotten” pole is then still retrievable, but the retrieval requires conscious reflection.
As regards the quantifiers, the hypothesis is thus that lexicalization takes place at the
level described in Figure 12.d for the vertices of the triad of contraries hA;Y;Ii.
The I-vertex was retrieved by Aristotle, through conscious reflection.
Often words occupying the Y- and I-positions of the kite structures involved are
phonologically identical, thus creating a systematic ambiguity. The prototypical ex-
ample is, of course, the culturally created ambiguity of the quantifying word some
and its equivalents in all languages spoken in sufficiently sophisticated societies.
Outside logic, the same is found with, for example, the word animal, which has its
wider, academic sense in the I-position and its common, more restricted sense in the
Y-position of the kite. Likewise for the word sea, which is opposed to ocean when
used in the Y-position but covers both (minimal) sea and ocean in the I-position. (To
say that a ship is at sea does not imply that it is not in an ocean.) Or the word gay,
which comprises both male and female gays in its use in the I-position but only male
gays in the Y-position. The English word ground occupies the I-position (where it
includes the sea surface: the grounding of planes includes seaplanes), but the closely
related land occupies the Y-position (see Seuren and Jaspers [21]). The Romance
languages, however, have the same word (terra or terre) for both meanings. Why this
should be so is not clear beyond a speculative level of thought.
7 Conclusion
It thus seems that an uncluttered cognitive perspective on logic has a considerable
explanatory force, especially, but not exclusively, with regard to the clash between
standard modern predicate logic on the one hand and natural logical intuitions on the
other. The analyses presented here undercut the widely accepted but fallacious view
that Gricean pragmatics suffices as an account of this clash. They also show that
cognition, though subject to metaphysical necessity and to the laws of physics, has
managed to find its own functionally advantageous path through the maze of possi-
bilities afforded by these two great overarching sets of constraints. The present study
is an attempt at unveiling the hitherto mysterious selections made and the systems
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developed by human cognition in its effort to cope effectively with the big world “out
there.”
Cognition as it exists and functions in individuals and, by extension, in societies
and coherent groups of humans in general can only be an object of scientifically ex-
planatory inquiry if it is recognized that it has structures and principles of its own,
many of which are formally definable. Cognition does not simply emulate mathemat-
ics, nor is it a processing machine that receives material input and produces material
output according to the laws of physics. This quasi-objectivity fallacy has stymied
progress in the human sciences for too long. The recognition of the specifically hu-
man factor in cognitive processes is a prerequisite for the human sciences to become
truly scientific.
Notes
1. A conspicuous case, not discussed in the present study, where the Gricean maxims are
seen to be irrelevant is the following. Sentence (ia) is immediately felt to be equivalent
with sentence (ib). Yet (iia) is not at all immediately felt to be equivalent with (iib), even
though both (i) and (ii) are instances of the De Morgan’s conversion laws:
(i) a She doesn’t like planes or trains.
b She doesn’t like planes and she doesn’t like trains.
(ii) a She doesn’t like planes and trains.
b She doesn’t like planes or she doesn’t like trains.
Here, the Gricean maxims have nothing to say. The cases (i) and (ii) are not further
analyzed here, as the present study is restricted to predicate logic. For a discussion, see
Seuren [18, pp. 108–14].
2. Bivalence is not a necessity. It is perfectly possible to have, say, three truth values, for
example, true with two kinds of falsity, false I and false II, as in my presuppositional
logic. Or one can have an infinity of truth values with gradual transitions, as in Zadeh’s
so-called “fuzzy” logic (see Zadeh [23]). And other variations on this theme are viable.
3. It is possible to define the metalogical relations in terms of the truth-functional connec-
tives. Thus, P ` Q is equivalent to .P ! Q/, where  stands for “for all possible
situations.” PQ is thus definable as :.P ^Q/, P Q as .P _Q/, Pj Q as
 .P YQ/ (Y standing for the exclusive _), and P  Q as .P ! Q/^ .Q! P /.
This notation in terms of the truth-functional connectives is not used here, as it is as-
sumed that the use of single symbols for each metalogical relation makes for easier read-
ing.
4. In the figures, arrows stand for entailment, C for contrariety, crosses, stars or CD for
contradictoriness,D for logical equivalence, SC for subcontrariety, and the absence of a
connecting line for logical independence.
5. It will become clear below that a distinction must be made between the classical negation
:, which selects a complement in the unrestricted universe of discourse Un! , and the
minimal negation , which does so within some restricted universe of discourse UnR.
6. The traditional notation is A for all R is M, I for some R is M, E for no R is M, and O for
not all R is M. This notation is due to the Aristotle commentator Boethius, whose render-
ing of Aristotelian predicate logic determined the history of this subject throughout the
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Middle Ages and beyond, until˙ 1900. Boethius took the vowels A and I from the Latin
word AffIrmo (I affirm) and the vowels E and O from Latin nEgO (I deny). It served well
throughout the Middle Ages and later, but our analysis requires a more refined notation,
which makes the position of the negation explicit: : for the external negation and * for
the internal negation.
7. I adopt the standard notation of double bracketing to denote the extension of a predicate:
for any predicate Z, ŒŒZ is the set of elements for which Z delivers truth.
8. It is still widely believed that Aristotle created the square with the conversions and thus
with the fault of UEI. This belief is false (see [18, pp. 149–55] for a detailed account).
It has been well known for some time among serious historians of logic that Aristotle
did not commit the error of UEI, but this insight has not been widely publicized. That
Abelard restored Aristotle’s predicate logic to its pristine, error-free form is my own
contribution.
9. Another way of making ABPL sound, envisaged neither by modern logicians nor by
Aristotle or Abelard, consists in keeping the square as it is, complete with conversions
and UEI, and treating the condition that ŒŒR ¤ ; as a presupposition. (More is said
below in Section 5.2.) Propositions not satisfying that presupposition are relegated to
a nondefault region of logic which makes them radically false, a more drastic form of
falsity than ordinary or minimal falsity requiring a marked, discourse-correcting radical
negation to yield truth. The default part of the system then stays classically bivalent, but
the nondefault part adds radical falsity as a third truth value. It is claimed in [18] and
earlier publications that this is how UEI is solved in natural language.
10. Another element in Hamiltonian logic is the so-called quantification of the predicate,
which allows for sentences such as all Romans are some mortals or some Romans are all
mortals. Since this device of double quantification does not seem to yield any gains, it is
not discussed here.
11. The term and the notion of valuation space stem fromVan Fraassen [22], where, however,
the potential of that notion remained underdeveloped.
12. The number of possible situations explodes exponentially as more sentences are added.
With 10 logically independent sentences, we have 210 or 1024 possible situations. With
25 sentences there are 225 or 33,554,432 possible situations. How to define the astro-
nomical number of possible situations with an infinite set of sentences is a question I am
happy to leave to arithmeticians. It has no relevance in the present context.
13. Most logicians using generalized quantification take theR-predicate as the first or subject
and theM -predicate as the second or object term. Yet the grammatical mapping process
from the logical language here described to the surface form of sentences is crucially
simplified if the M -predicate is taken to be the subject and the R-predicate the object
term (see [18, p. 55]). Moreover, the logical notion of scope is now definable for all
cases as the subject (D first) term of the predicate.
14. No distinction is made here between first-order and higher-order sets: the variables X
and Y stand for higher-order sets of any rank. In most practical cases, however, X and Y
will be first-order sets.
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15. Chapter 8 in [20] specifies an algorithmic procedure leading from all possible set-
theoretic relations between ŒŒR and ŒŒM  to the distribution over the spaces 1 to 4.
16. I am indebted to Hans Smessaert, of Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (pc), for the ar-
rangement of the vertices in Figure 4.b and later polygonal representations. In previous
publications I have had different arrangements, but the one given here is clearly the cor-
rect one, as it shows better than other arrangements the symmetries in the system. For
the logic as such, the arrangement makes no difference. Note that in the minimalist
representation of Figure 4.c the symbol CD has become unnecessary, as all relations of
contradictoriness pass through the center. This is, in effect, a test for the minimalness of
polygonal representations, as is confirmed in later figures.
17. Jespersen [10, p. 85] picks the example of not lukewarm, which “in most cases means less
than lukewarm, i.e. cold or something between cold and lukewarm.” This observation
is open to doubt, as lukewarm seems to have a directionality from warm to cold: The
coffee was still lukewarm. This directionality seems due to a presupposition induced by
lukewarm to the effect that what is said to be lukewarm should be warmer: a lukewarm
reception. Not lukewarm would thus preferably suggest “warm” rather than “cold.”
18. This fact is recognized in Seuren [18, pp. 99–101], which was written when the analysis
proposed in the remainder of the present paper had not yet been developed. The ten-
tative solution proposed in [18] for cases like (1) and (2) rests on the assumption of an
underlying default topic-comment structure in not-all sentences, which would induce a
presupposition of existence and thus rule out the no-cases (the :I-vertex). In the light of
the new analysis presented here, I now consider this answer to be superseded.
19. For the universal nonlexicalization of O- and U-vertices across languages, see Seuren
and Jaspers [21]. To give one example out of many, crime (the A-vertex) entails illegal
(the I-vertex); illegal is theUn-restricted contradictory (contrary without Un-restriction)
of legal (the I-vertex); no lexicalization exists for “not-crime” (the :A-vertex), cov-
ering both minor wrongdoings and legal acts, but there is the lexicalization offense (the
Y-vertex) for what constitutes a breach of the law but is not a crime, such as a traffic
offense. Nor is there a lexicalization for the U-vertex, meaning “either a crime or legal.”
20. An analogous analysis should be given of the cognitive ontogenesis of propositional
logic, which will then probably be seen to make explicit the well-known relation between
some and or on the one hand, and between all and and on the other. That work, however,
has not been carried out so far. Despite this incompleteness, it seemed opportune to offer
the results for predicate logic for publication, pending further developments.
21. The notation used for the minimal negation  is deficient in that  should be formally
indexed for the restricted domain it selects its argument’s complement in. I have not
introduced such indexing since to do so would require a fairly complex mechanism,
which would add to the length of the present study and might thus detract from the
main issues. A formally more precise notation will no doubt follow. I trust that, despite
this formal deficiency, the gist of the analysis will be clear.
22. As is well known, when expressed in terms of the material implication for all and the
conjunction for some, as proposed by Russell and common practice during the whole
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of the twentieth century, standard modern predicate logic does not work for space 5, re-
served for a null universe, since variable substitution is impossible in space 5. This prob-
lem is solved by the language of generalized quantification, whose semantics is based on
set theory and thus does not require any mechanism of variable substitution. In a null
Un, the classic example of a logically necessary truth, all bachelors are unmarried, loses
that status in all logics where the universal quantifier requires nonnullness of theR-class.
When cast in terms of the material implication, with its standard truth table, that is, as
“for all x, if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried,” the sentence is uninterpretable due
to lack of substitution values. When cast in the terms of generalized quantification, as
“the set of all bachelors is included in the set of all unmarrieds,” the sentence regains its
status of analytical necessity.
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